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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15150 
LORRAINE HUNTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order denying appellant's 
motion in arrest of judgment and for leave to withdraw her plea 
of guilty. The motion was denied by the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, Judge in the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District, in and for the County of Weber. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On October 15, 1973, appellant pleaded guilty to 
an amended information charging her with obtaining merchandise 
by false representation, exceeding $100.00, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-8 (1953), as amended. The plea was 
accepted by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District Court 
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Judge of the Second Judicial District. Appellant was 
subsequentl:1 sentenced on r-:ovell'ber 5, lq73, etn'1 placed 
on probation. The special conditions of the probation 
agreement were that appellant serve sixty days in the 
Weber County Jail and not deal in any form of credit. 
Appellant was subsequently returned to the 
court in February of 1974 for violating the terms of 
her probation and was committed to the Weber County Jail. 
Thereafter she was transferred to the Utah State Prison 
for a 90-day diagnostic evaluation. Upon completion of 
the evaluation, the Division of Corrections recorrunended 
that probation be denied. Pending pronouncement of the 
final sentence, appellant was released on her.own 
recognizance and fled the State. She subsequently 
returned to this jurisdiction and was arrested on 
March 14, 1977. 
On March 21, 1977, a hearing was held before 
Judge Wahlquist and appellant made a motion in arrest of 
judgment and for leave to withdraw her plea of guilty. 
The motion was denied, and the court placed appellant 
in the Utah State Hospital in Provo for a further pr~ 
sentence evaluation. It is fro111 the denial of the motion 
in arrest of judgment and for leave to withdraw a plea 
of guilty that appellant appeals. 
-2-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the 
Second Judicial District Court denying appellant's 
motions affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During October of 1972 appellant purchased 
a 1972 Chevrolet Station Wagon from Lyle's Used Cars 
in Ogden, Utah. The purchase price was $3,995.00. 
At the time of sale, appellant paid $1,000.00 down and 
filled out a credit application making certain false 
representations. The balance of the purchase price 
was financed by Lyle's Used Cars through the Bank of 
Utah over a period of 36 months at the rate of $107.03 
per month. Appellant purchased insurance for her car 
under a name different from the. one she used to purchase 
the car (Transcript of Hearing, p. S). 
Appellant received her payment book and made 
the first three payments. She thereafter moved to 
Las Vegas, Nevada, in order to obtain employment, but 
was unsuccessful. She was also unable to obtain welfare 
because of her non-residence and thus discontinued to 
make payments on the automobile. 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On or about the 11th day of July, 1973, the 
Bank of Utah caused the automobile in question to be 
repossessed in Las Vegas, and further filed a complaint 
with the Weber County Attorney's Office charging the 
appellant with obtaining merchandise by false rePresent<-
tion in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-8 (1953), 
as amended. Appellant was subsequently arrested in 
Nevada on a Utah warrant and was extradited to Utah 
where she was incarcerated in the Weber County Jail 
on or about the 20th day of September, 1973. She was 
unable to raise bail, having been refused O.R. releae, 
and remained incarcerated. 
The automobile was subsequently returned to 
Utah and sold by the Bank of Utah. 
Appellant was arraigned on September 20, 1973, 
the Court having appointed Maurice Richards of Ogden, 
Utah, as counsel for the appellant (R.8). On October 
10, 1973, appellant pleaded not guilty at her arraign-
ment in District Court (R.12). On the day of the tr~~ 
October 15, 1973, she pleaded guilty to an amended 
information (R.13). Apparently the county attorney 
offered to recommend that appellant be placed on probatii 
in return for a guilty plea (Transcript of Hearing for 
Imposition of Sentence and Motion of Counsel, P· 2- 3). 
(See also R.14.) 
-4-
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On November 5, 1973, appellant was placed 
under the supervision of the Adult Probation and Parole 
Department and was ordered to serve a ter~ of sixty 
days in the Weber County Jail. She was also ordered 
not to deal in any form of credit (R.14). 
Appellant served her sixty days and was 
released on December 21, 1973 (R.17). 
On February 15, 1974, appellant appeared 
before Judge Wahlquist to show cause why her probation 
should not be revoked (R.18,21). An affidavit had 
been filed alleging that appellant had 9harged gas 
at a Texaco Station in Ogden under a fictitious name 
(R.20). Another affidavit charged appellant with 
petty theft, to-wit: stealing two cartons of cigarettes 
in Wangsgard Motel (R.23). To these alleged violations 
she pleaded guilty (R.18,48-54). 
Appellant was committed by Judge Wahlquist 
on February 15, 1974, to the Board of Corrections at 
the Utah State Prison for a 90-day evaluation (R.24). 
She was returned to the court on May 14, 1974, for 
sentencing, which was continued to May 20, 1974. She 
was released on her own recognizance in the meantime. 
Appellant thereafter left the State of Utah, not to 
return until 1977. On May 24, 1974, a bench warrant 
-5-
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was issued against the appellant (R.28). 
On March 14, 1977, appellant was arrested 
by the Weber County authorities and incarcerated in 
the Weber County Jail. 
On March 21, 1977, appellant was again 
committed to the Board of Corrections at the Utah 
State Prison and at the Utah State Hospital for a 
90-day psychiatric evaluation pursuant to an order 
by Judge Wahlquist (R.37). On the same day, appellant 
filed a motion in arrest of judgment and for leave 
to withdraw plea of guilty, which motion was denied by 
Judge Wahlquist (R. 40). The denial of appellant's motion 
was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, and is the subjec' 
of this brief. On May 2, 1977, appellant wai releas~oo 
her own recognizance pending the outcome of the appeal 
by order of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah on 
May 2, 1977. 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UTAH S'l'ATUTORY LAW PRECLUDES THE 
WITHDRAWAL OF A GUILTY PLEA AFTER 
JUDGMENT. 
Appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of obtaining 
merchandise by false representation in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-20-8 (1953), on October 15, 1973 (R. 13). 
Judgment was entered in November 5, 1973 (R. 14). on 
March 21, 1977, some 4 and 1/3 years later, appellant through 
counsel filed a Motion in Arrest of Judgment and For Leave 
to Withdraw Plea of Guilty (R. 36). Said motion was denied 
(Transcript of Hearing for Imposition of Sentence), and this 
appeal was filed subsequently by appellant (R. 41). 
Before addressing the merits of appellant's motion 
in Points II and IV, respondent respectfully submits that 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-3 (1953), appellant is 
precluded from withdrawing her plea of guilty. The statute 
states in part: 
"The court may at any time before 
judgment, upon a plea of guilty, permit 
it to be withdrawn and a plea of not 
guilty substituted." (Emphasis added) 
Unless the emphasized portion of the above statute is 
disregarded or considered superfluous,the plain impact of 
its language is to allow guilty pleas to be withdrawn only before 
-7-
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judgment. Similarily, Section 77-34-1, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) also precludes appellant's Motion in Arrest of 
Judgment. That particular section states in par~: 
"The motion in arrest of 
judgment must be made before or 
at the time the defendant is called 
for judgment." (Emphasis added). 
Seemingly, then, without further consideration of 
the merits of appellant's motion, such an attempt to have 
the judgment arrested and guilty plea withdrawn and substitut, 
with a not guilty plea should be dismissed as untimely. 
Further discussion and review of similar statutes in other 
states (infra) support respondent's view. 
The Utah Supreme Court has reviewed on several 
occasions cases in which defendants have attempted to withdra, 
guilty pleas following judgment, but has addressed itself 
to issues involving abuse of discretion rather than to the 
issue of untimeliness of the motion itself. 
In State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P.2d 825 
(1932), the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the 
charge of murder in the second degree and was sentenced to 
an indeterminate term of imprisonment in the Utah State 
Prison. The defendant was released on a writ of habeas 
corpus because the indeterminate sentence was not authorized 
by law. Upon his release, the defendant was immediately 
arrested and returned to the district court for the 
-8-
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imposition of a proper sentence. The defendant objected 
to the jurisdiction of the district court, and without 
waivin1 that objection, insisted on withdrawing his former 
plea of guilty as a matter of right. The district court 
denied the motion, and sentenced the defendant according 
to law. The Utah Supreme icourt affirmed on appeal in a 
lengthy opinion directed largely to the question of the 
district court's jurisdiction. On the issue of withdrawal 
of the guilty plea, the Court stated that the statute was 
permissive and not mandatory, that the trial court's refusal 
to allow withdrawal would only be reversed upon a showing 
of an abuse of discretion, and that no abuse had been shown. 
The question of the timeliness of the motion was not addressed, 
presumably because the initial sentence was held void and 
the motion was therefore "before judgment." 
In State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 
(1963) , this Court considered the question of whether a 
lower court had corrunitted error in refusing to allow a 
defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty after sentence had 
been pronounced. This Court concluded that an abuse of 
discretion had not been shown and affirmed the lower court. 
On the question of whether the motion had been timely made, 
the Court stated: 
-9-
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"Were it not for the holding 
in State v. Lee Lim, supra, it would 
be the writer's personal opinion that 
coram nobis should be the court remedy 
ir: Utah. (See State v. Telavern, 7G 
Ariz. 183, 261 P.2d 997, and People 
v. Wade, 53 Col. 2d 322, 1 Cal. Rptr. 
683, 348 P.2d 116)." 378 P.2d at 672 
Judge Jones did not state why'he felt the Lee Lim decision 
controlled the result in Plum. 
In Egan v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 143, 499 P.2d 286 
(1972), defendant appealed to this Court from a decision of 
the District Court denying his petition for a writ of habea~ 
corpus. In his petition, he alleged that the trial court 
had erred by refusing to permit him to change his plea 
after sentence had been pronounced. Defendant contended 
among other things that he had asked his counsel to request 
the trial court to permit him to change his plea to one of 
not guilty. In dismissing defendant's claim, this Court 
was unable to address itself to the issue of timeliness 
of such a request due to the fact that the record did not 
reveal whether defendant had applied to the trial court for 
permission to withdraw his guilty plea either before or 
after sentence was pronounced. 
Subsequently, in State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 
(Utah 1976), this Court again had the opportunity to 
-10-
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address itself to the issue of whether a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea is untimely if made subsequent to judgment. 
The Court again refused to allow such a change of plea 
following sentencing, but on the grounds that an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court had not been 
shown. 
The final two cases which have been heard by this 
Court involving motions to set aside guilty pleas following 
sentencing were State v. Soper, 559 P.2d 951 (Utah 1977), 
and State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978). In Soper, 
the defendant became involved in a plea bargaining process 
between himself and two separate jurisdictions within the 
State. There occurred a breach of the plea bargain in one 
jurisdiction, but this breach was not called to the attention 
of his defense counsel or the court in either jurisdiction 
until some eight months after the breach occurred and five 
months following sentencing. The Supreme Court dismissed 
the appellant's contentions, but again on the grounds that 
no abuse of discretion had been shown. The Court did add 
however that one seeking to set aside a final order such as 
a sentence in a criminal case has the burden of producing 
convincing proof of a fact which constitutes a legal ground 
for setting aside such a sentence: 
"A motion to set aside a plea 
after sentencing is addressed to 
the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Unless the allegations and 
-11-
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proof 6f facts have the effect 
of requiring the trial court, as 
a matter of law, to grant the ~ 
motion, no abuse of discretion has 
been shown." 599 P.2d at 953, 954. 
(Emphasis added). 
In Harris, supra, defendant's attempt to withdraw 
his guilty plea following an unfavorable sentence was 
rejected by this Court on the basis that no abuse of 
discretion had been shown in the trial court's refusal to 
grant the defendant's motion. 
From an examination of the above authorities, it 
appears that the question of the timeliness of a motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty after judgment and sentence has 
never been squarely put to this Court, nor has this Court 
ever held that a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty after 
judgment was properly granted. 
Respondent therefore urges this Court to accept 
the rule embodied in Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-3 (1953), 
and to deny appellant's request to withdraw her plea of 
guilty as not timely. To do so would be in line with 
several courts of other states which have held that statutes 
similar to Utah's only allow withdrawal of guilty pleas 
before judgment. State v. Churton, 9 Ariz. App. 16, 448 
p. 2d 888 (1968); State v. Rinehart, 253 Iowa 1132, 125 N.W. 
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2d 242, 245 (1963); McConnell v. People, 157 Colo. 235, 
402 P.2d 75, 77 (1965); and People v. Grand, 16 Cal. App. 
3rd 27, 93 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1971). 
Appellant cites two Colorado cases in support 
of her argument. Champion v. People,124 Colo. 253, 236 
P.2d 127 (1951); Gearhart v. People, 113 Colo. 9, 154 P.2d 
47 (1944). It should be noted that in Gearhart, a motion 
for leave to withdraw a plea of guilty was denied. In the 
Champion case, the Colorado Supreme Court allowed defendant's 
guilty plea to be withdrawn because, among other reasons., 
defendant was not represented by counsel when he pled 
guilty, he did not understand the nature of the charges 
brought against him, and he did not understand the significance 
of pleading guilty. In 1964, however, in the case of 
Glaser v. People, 155 Colo. 504, 395 P.2d 461 (1964), 
the Colorado Supreme Court held that Rule 32(e) of the 
Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibited the withdrawal 
of a guilty plea after sentencing. 1 The implication of 
1 Rule 32(e) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides as follows: 
" ..• A motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty ... may be made only before sentence 
is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended." 
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this Rule was again upheld in the later cases of McCon:-iell v. 
People, supra; Bradley v. People, 485 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1971); 
and People v. Banks, 545 P.2d 1356 (Colo. 1976). In~ 
plea of guilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the 
court where the motion to withdraw is filed before sentencin;. 
The Court, quoting from Glaser v. People, supra, reasoned 
as follows: 
'"[t]here is no ambiguity in 
the rule [Crim. P. 32(e)] as 
adopted by this court. In plain 
language it says that a motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty may be 
made only before sentence is im-
posed. Trial courts accept pleas 
of guilty to crimes after assurance 
that the defendant understands the 
consequences of that plea. The rule 
contended for by counsel for defendant 
would require that defendant also be 
satisfied with, and approve of, the 
consequences actually imposed by the 
court. " 
Examination of the cases heretofore cited, as well 
as a plain and simple reading of Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-3 
(1953),leads to one inescapable conclusion - that finality 
of judgments should be accorded recognition and an accused 
should not be allowed to gamble with the Court's time and 
power. An accused should not be permitted to withdraw a 
guilty plea simply because the consequences turn out to be 
less favorable than when the plea was voluntarily and 
-14-
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intelligently made, particularly when the plea was tendered 
well over four years earlier. Respondent thus submits that 
th2 motion tendered by appellant in the case at bar was 
properly denied as untimely, and asks that this Court so hold. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
APPELLANT TO WITHDRAW HER GUILTY 
PLEA. 
Appellant, having pled guilty to the offense with 
which she had been charged and thereby sentenced, returned 
involuntarily to the District Court approximately four and 
one-third years later and sought to withdraw her guilty 
plea. She has seemingly taken a "shotgun" approach in 
stating the grounds by which she feels her guilty plea 
should be withdrawn and a not guilty plea substituted. In 
her brief, she makes a flat allegation that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying her motion, but does not 
give any specific examples or incidents as to how or why 
she may have been prejudiced. She does allege in Points 
II and III of her brief that she was denied effective 
assistance of counsel and that her plea was illicited through 
duress. Quite a substantial portion of her argument alleges 
that "new evidence" has been uncovered, which, if known at 
the time of her plea, may have provided her with a defense 
to the crime to which she pleaded guilty. 
-15-
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Appellant has more or less "lumped" her allegation' 
together without giving specific examples or details of her 
alleged points of error. Respondent will, however, atte~t 
to treat each allegation separately as far as possible for 
the sake of expedience, clarity, and hopefully the con-
venience of this Court. 
Appellant has alleged that her motion to withdru 
her guilty plea should have been granted by the lower court, 
and in so refusing there existed an abuse of discretion. 
The law in Utah is extremely clear on this point. As far 
back as 1932 when this Court decided State v. Lee Lim, 79 
Utah 68, 7 P. 2d 825 (1932), the position of this Court has 
consistently been that a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, 
and the trial court's decision can only be reversed where 
an abuse of discretion has been demonstrated. State v. 
Larson, 560 P.2d 335 (Utah, 1977), State v. Forsyth, 560 
P.2d 337 (Utah 1977). This principle has recently been 
reaffirmed by this Court in the case of State v. Harris, 581 
P.2d 450 (Utah 1978). 2 
2 For other cases holding that Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-3 
(1953) confere a discretionary power upon the trial c~ur 
to allow or disallow the change of a plea, and such d~s· 
cretion will not be interferred with unless an abuse 1: 
shown, see the following: State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 124
1 (Utah 1977); State v. Olafson, 567 P.2d 156 (Utah 1971; 
State v. Gotschall, 570 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1977); ~
Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976). 
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~n determing whether this Court will find that a 
trial court has abused its discretion in denying a motion 
to set aside a judgment and allow a guilty plea to be with-
drawn, a test has been set forth. In State v. Soper, 559 
P.2d 951 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court, in denying 
petitioner's claim that his motion to vacate his plea of 
guilty should have been sustained, held that no abuse of 
discretion claim will be upheld unless facts are presented, 
which,as a matter of law, require that the trial court 
grant such a motion: 
"A sentence in a criminal case is 
a final judgment, and one seeking to set 
aside such a final order has the burden 
of producing convincing proof of a fact 
which constitutes a legal ground for 
setting aside such a sentence. A motion 
to set aside a plea after sentencing is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Unless the allegations and 
proof of facts have the effect of re-
quiring the trial court, as a matter of 
law, to grant the motion, no abuse of 
discretion has been shown." 559 P.2d 
at 953, 954. {Emphasis added). 
The Soper case is significant in that it parallels 
the case at bar in two respects: (1) in Soper the defendant 
remained silent, not moving for his guilty plea to be with-
drawn until nine months after the plea was entered, and five 
months after sentencing. In the present case, appellant 
remained silent well over four years following her guilty 
plea and sentencing; (2) in both Soper and the present case 
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the motions to withdraw guilty pleas were made after 
sentencing. 
It thus follows from Soper that appellant must 
allege and set forth facts which, as a matter of law, would 
require granting of her motion to vacate the guilty plea. 
Such a burden rests entirely upon her shoulders, and there 
is nothing in the record to substantiate her allegations 
of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
It is noteworthy that this Court in Soper, when 
referring to the portion of its opinion wherein the burden 
of producing facts constituting legal grounds for setting 
aside judgments is placed on the petitioner, uses the term 
"convincing proof" in describing such facts. Perhaps a 
degree of proof such as "convincing" or "clear and con-
vincing" is required. See People v. Cruz, 116 ca·l. Rptr. 
242, 526 P.2d 250 (1974). Be that as it may, appellant 
has not met such a standard, nor has appellant carried the 
burden of producing any facts to substantiate her allegation; 
as required by State v. Soper, supra, and State v. Larson, 
supra. 
In order for appellant's motion for withdrawal 
of her guilty plea to have been granted, it would seem 
that the plea itself must be made to appear void or 
defective because pf one of the reasons set forth in ~ 
Plum, supra: 
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"It has not been made to appear 
that the accused entered his plea 
of guilty in ig~orance of his rights, 
or that he was immature or illiterate 
~r that he w~s influenced unduly or ' 
improperly either by hope or fear, 
or that his plea was entered by 
reason of mistake, misapprehension 
or undue influence. 378 P.2d 
at 673. 
The record does not substantiate a claim by appellant 
based upon any of the foregoing reasons. In her brief, 
she has alleged no facts tending to show an abuse of 
discretion. 
A. 
THERE HAS BEEN NO SHOWING, THAT 
APPELLANT'S PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY. 
There have been no facts set forth by appellant 
in the record which would indicate that her plea cf guilty 
was anything but voluntarily and intelligently given. The 
record indicates that, having been advised of her rights by 
Judge Wahlquist, appellant pleaded guilty (R. 13). She 
had pleaded not guilty five days earlier (R. 12). Her plea 
of guilty was apparently entered with the understanding that 
the prosecutor would recommend probation at the sentencing 
hearing. The court sentenced appellant to serve 60 days 
in jail and thereafter to be placed on probation. The plea 
bargain was fulfilled, and appellant does not challenge her 
guilty plea on the basis that the plea bargain was breached. 
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It is noteworthy, however, that under Utah law, even if the 
trial court had not followed the prosecutor's sentencing 
recommendation, the c;uilty plea would have been valid and 
a motion to withdraw the plea based upon abuse of discretion 
by the trial court would have been frivolous. State v. 
Plum, supra; State v. Forsyth, supra; State v. Garfield, 
supra; State v. Harris, supra; Guglielmetti v. Turner, 27 Utah 
2d 3 41 , 4 9 6 p • 2d 2 61 ( 19 72 ) . 
If appellant is to have the guilty plea vacated 
as being involuntary or unintelligently given, several 
presumptions must be overcome. It has been held that when 
a defendant enters a plea of guilty upon the advice of a 
competent attorney, the plea is deemed to be intelligently 
entered. Guglielmettiv. Turner, supra, at 496 P.2d 262. 
In Mayne v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 195, 468 P.2d 369 (1970), 
this Court said that a plea of guilty is presumed to be 
voluntary and knowledgeable. Similarly, the Arizona Supr~e 
Court in State v. Mccallister, 107 Ariz. 143, 483 P.2d 558 
(1971), stated: 
". , a presumption exists that 
when a defendant who is represented by 
counsel changes his plea at trial from 
not guilty to guilty as a result of 
plea bargaining, he does so with full 
knowledge of the facts and consequences 
thereof. State v. Martinez, 102 Ariz. 215, 
427 P. 2d 533 (1967)." 483 P. 2d at 560. 
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It cannot be said that the prosecution or the 
trial judge reneged on their portion of the plea bargain 
in the present case. If anything, appellant violated her 
part of the agreement when, after being released from jail 
and put on probation as agreed, she violated the terms of 
her probation. Her guilty plea was accepted in good faith 
after having been tendered in good faith. This is supported 
by the record in this case. Respondent therefore submits 
that appellant cannot now claim that:1erplea was anything 
other than voluntary and intelligent. 
B. 
THERE HAS BEEN NO SHOWING THAT 
APPELLANT'S PLEA WAS THE PRODUCT 
OF INEFFECTIVE OR INCOMPETENT 
COUNSEL. 
Appellant alleges in Point II of her brief that 
she received the assistance of ineffective counsel, and thus 
her guilty plea was unknowing, ill advised, and mistaken. 
She bases this assumption on the theory that counsel urged 
her to change her plea to guilty in an effort to resolve 
the case as expediously as possible and to avoid further 
work, discomfort, and consumption of time. It is of 
extreme importance to emphasize that this theory propounded 
by appellant is totally unsupported by any factual re-
presentation whatsoever in the record in this case. What 
appellant has done some four years after her plea was 
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tendered is to finally recognize the inconvenience and 
ramification of her irreputable life-style, and now 
see:: to vi~Jicate her past through th~ legal proc2s3 
by conjuring up all the arguments usually set forth 
by those in her circumstance, one of these arguments being 
that her counsel is to blame for her present "unjustified" 
predicament. Here again, appellant alleges that her coumcl 
failed to uncover evidence which would have served as a basi< 
for her defense. This evidence is presented for the first 
time in her brief, and is no where to be found in the record. 
Such issues will be discussed more fully in respondent's 
Points III and IV, infra. 
Focusing specifically on the allegation by 
appellant that her plea was involuntary because of ineffective 
and incompetent counsel, and thus the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying her motion to withdraw the plea, 
Respondent calls the Court's attention to State v. Forsyth, 
supra, at 560 P.2d 339, where the Court addressed a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel where a guilty plea was 
involved: 
~In this proceeding defendant 
had the burden to persuade the 
court that his counsel failed in 
some manner to represent his 
interests, which resulted in 
prejudice to his defense, in 
which burden he failed. The motion 
to withdraw a plea of guilty is 
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addressed to the discretion of the 
court; and as in all discretionary 
matters, due to his prerogatives -
and his advantaged position, the 
trial judge is allowed considerable 
latitude in the exercise of that 
discretion, \.1hich the appellate 
court will not interfere with unless 
it plainly appears that there was 
abuse thereof. On the basis of 
the record before us and what has 
been said herein, we are not 
persuaded that there was any such 
abuse of discretion." 
It becomes evident from Forsyth, that: (1) the burden 
rests upon the defendant to show ineffective assistance of 
counsel; (2) if there is a failure to adequately represent 
the interests of the defendant, such a'failure must result 
in prejudice to the defense; (J) such failure to adequately 
represent the defendant must appear ~ the record, and 
not be merely an allegation by one, who having plead guilty, 
now finds himself in distress. Referring to the latter 
technique, used quite frequently by those who find themselves 
incarcerated following conviction, this Court said in the 
Forsyth, opinion: 
"In regard to the defendant's 
contention that he was not accorded 
the right to effective counsel, this 
is to be said: it is not at all 
uncommon for one who finds himself 
in such trouble as having been found 
or pleaded guilty to a crime to turn 
upon and impute fault to one who 
has previously tried to assist him. 
But the mere assertion of such a 
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charge does not prove the fact. 
This is especially so because the 
assertion is suffused with such 
self-interest that the trial court 
is not bnund to believe it . 
Id. at 339. 
Respondent submits that appellant is one of the 
many convicted to which the above quote is directed. 
Appellant has not carried the burden showing that there has 
been ". 
. a flagrant abuse of legal procedure as to 
amount to bad faith on the part of the lawyer." Jaramillo 
v. Turner,24 Utah 2d 19, ~65 P.2d 343 (1970); Forsvth, ~· 
In State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976), 
this Court again addressed the issue of effective assiste~ 
of counsel and the burden incidental thereto on defendant 
to show such: 
"A defendant bears the burden of 
establishing the inadequacy or in-
effectiveness of counsel, and proof of 
such must be a demonstrable reality 
and not a speculative matter. " 
554 P.2d at 204. (Emphasis added) 
Respondent submits that appellant's allegations 
are purely speculative, without foundation in or outside 
of the record. She entered the plea, represented by 
competent counsel, and as such the plea must be deemed 
intelligently entered, Guglielmetti v. Turner, supra, and 
done with full knowlege of the facts and consequences 
thereof. State v. Mccallister, supra. 
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Appellant seemed very willing at the time of trial 
to enter a guilty plea in exchange for 60 days in jail and 
probation thereafter. The record indicates the plea was 
entered following her being advised of her rights by Judge 
Wahlquist (R. 13). If such a plea was recommended by her 
counsel, it certainly will fall within the "ambit of an 
attorney's legitimate exercise of judgment as to the trial 
tactics or strategy. State v. McNicol, supra, at 554 
P.2d 205. What was said in McNicol is equally appropriate 
in the present case, that being "there is no basis to hold 
counsel so inept the proceedings become a farce or sham." 
Id. 554 P.2d 205. In the present case, the proceedings 
were nothing other than orderly, and as such, respondent 
submits that no ineffective assistance of counsel resulting 
in prejudice to appellant's defense can be found in this 
case, on or off the record. 
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c. 
THERE HAS BEEN NO SHO\\TING THAT 
APPJ:: :,SANT' S PLEA \·,)AS THE PHODUCT 
OF DURESS, COERCION, OR UNDUE 
INFLUENCE. 
Appellant, in Point III of her brief, alleges 
that her guilty plea was elicited because of her self-
imposed duress. She alleges that this duress was the 
result of her desires to bring her incarceration to an 
end and "find out" what her sentence would be. She also 
alleges that because of her incarceration due to her 
failure to obtain bond, she was unable to investigate the 
facts leading to her arrest. 
Respondent respectfully submits that these cla~ 
are frivolous at best, and state no claim for relief. The'. 
simply are no facts to substantitate these claims--mere~ 
allegations. Even if there was a factual foundation on the 
record to support appellant's allegations, there would be 
no legal basis to sustain a finding that these allegat~M 
exerted undue influence to the point that her guilty plea 
was the result of coercion. 
Cases in which evidence has been presented 
alluding to greater claims of coercion than in the present 
case have been rejected by this Court: Combs v. Turner, 
25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P. 2d 437 <1971), where a husband plead• 
guilty to free his wife from a felony charge, it was~~· 
a bargain did not amount to coercion; Strong v. Turner, 
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22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 323 (1969), where defendant pleaded 
guilty in ceturn for a promise by the prosecutor that remaining 
charges would be dropped, it was held no coercion existed. 
See also State v. Gutierrez, 20 Ariz.App. 337, 512 P.2d 
869 (1973); and State v. Parle, 110 Ariz. 517, 521 P.2d 604 
(197 4). 
Appellant has alleged that she was precluded from 
investigating her case because of her pre-trial incarceration. 
She apparently bases this theory on an assumption that her 
attorney could not or did not investigate her case. If 
this were the case, she should have moved the court for 
appointment of new counsel after so advising the court of her 
situation. Such was not done, and the record gives no indica-
tion that it should have been. 
It is apparent on the face of appellant's brief 
that she experienced the normal anticipations and hopes of 
most people who are faced with incarceration. Such anxieties, 
said this Court in State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976), 
are not sufficient to invalidate guilty pleas: 
••• a mere subjective belief of a 
defendant as to potential sentence, or hope 
of leniency, unsupported by any promise from 
the prosecutor or indication by the court, 
is insufficient to invalidate a guilty plea 
as involuntary or unknowing." 552 P.2d at 131. 
By comparison, it should be noted that in the present case 
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the prosecutor fulfilled appellant's hopes and desires by 
recommending probation after the guilty plea was tendered, 
Certainly appellant should not, four years after 
her guilty plea, be allowed to claim that her plea was 
involuntarily made because she wanted to "hurry up" and 
find out the nature of her sentence. Nor should she be 
granted relief by merely alleging,without proof, that she 
was precluded from investigating her case due to incar~& 
tion. Such statements are self-serving allegations 
unsupported by facts in the record, and as the Court 
enunciated in Klotz v. Turner, 23 Utah 2d 303, 462 P.2d 705 
(1969), form no basis for a finding that appellant's plea 
was coerced: 
"Lastly, Kloti says that the allegations 
of his petition alone should entitle him to the 
full treatment,-- ••• We think and hold that 
under the Rule mentioned, its very language 
eliminates such red-carpet treatment on the 
sole ~ of one who has pleaded guilty and 
obviously attempts some kind of detour from 
his own voluntary admissions, and an 
uncontradicted record, by simply shouting 
'coercion,' with no legitimate proffer of 
substance save his own contradictory gratuity." 
462 P.2d at 706. 
Respondent thus submits that appellant's allegati 
regarding coercion of her plea are unfounded in the record 
and should not be given credence by this Court. 
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POINT III 
APPELLANT'S ALLEGATIONS THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING HER MOTION 
IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT AND FOR LEAVE TO 
WITHDRAW HER PLEA OF GUILTY SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT BECAUSE SUCH 
ALLEGATIONS AND ANY FACTS TENDING TO SUPPORT 
THEM ARE NOT CONTAINED IN THE RECORD. 
Appellant has alleged that her guilty plea should 
be withdrawn for several reasons, including allegations that 
the plea was the product of coercion, undue influence and 
duress; that she was provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel; and that "new evidence" has been uncovered which 
would have provided her a valid defense at trial. There 
are no facts in the record to support these allegations. 
Facts referring to claims that appellant has uncovered "new 
evidence" are merely conjecture and theory on her part, 
with no substantiation in the record. Issues related to 
appellant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel 
and a guilty plea illicited through duress have been dealt 
with previously. However, no facts substantiating any of 
these claims have been asserted or produced in the record 
by appellant. None of these issues were raised at the time 
set for trial when her guilty plea was entered. Suddenly, 
four years later when appellant finds herself in danger 
of being incarcerated again, these issues are raised for 
the first time. 
This court has held that it is not inclined to 
reverse a condition on matters outside the record. 
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State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 
(1965). In Stat;o ,-. Kcls0y, 532 P"2d 1001 (Utah 197::;), 
this Court said that it would not review a claim of errm 
not raised in the lower court, except in some unusual 
exigency where it is necessary to do so to rectify a 
manifest injustice. See also Jaramillo v. Turner, supra, 
at 465 P.2d 344. 
More specifically, it has been held time and 
again by most courts in various states that factual 
matters presented in briefs filed by defendants but not 
found in the record are not entitled to consideration. 
State v. Fassler, 108 Ariz. 586, 503 P.2d 807 (1972); 
People v. Strickland, 114 Cal.Rptr. 632, 11 Cal.3d 946, 
523 P.2d 672 {1974); State v. Day, 7 Wash.App. 965, 503 
P.2d 1098 (1972); McConnell v. People, 402 P.2d 75 (Colo. 
1965). 
Appellant has presented to this Court no reason 
to go outside the record for the purpose of considering 
those facts she has alleged in her brief but which are 
not found in the record. No "manifest injustice" has beer 
shown,thus no need for rectification. Respondent thus 
submits that this Court is precluded from consideration °' 
those issues presented by appellant which are not supportc 
by facts in the record itself. 
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Appellant produced no transcript of the proceedings 
at which the guilty plea was taken. No witnesses were called 
or evidence presented at the hearing four years later on the 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea. What was said was merely 
a statement of theory propounded by the appellant. Since 
there is no transcript of the evidence in the proceedings 
in which the guilty plea was taken, a presumption of 
regularity and that the proceedings were carried on in 
conformity with law exist. Wheton v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 47, 
497 P.2d 856, cert. denied, 94 s.ct. 81, 414 U.S. 862, 
38 L.Ed.2d 112, reh. den. 94 s.ct. 1459, 415 u.s. 939, 39 
L.Ed.2d 498. There is thus no need for this Court to review 
the proceedings below, and appellant's claim should be 
dismissed without further consideration. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S ALLEGED DEFENSES TO THE CRIME OF 
OBTAINING MERCHANDISE BY FALSE PRETENSES ARE 
NOT VALID NOR SHOULD THEY BE CONSIDERED ON 
APPEAL. 
In appellant's brief, a theory as to why she should 
not be convicted as charged is presented. Appellant also 
alleges that the false credit application which she filled 
out is not to be found. 
Before addressing the merits of her claim, 
respondent submits that by her plea of guilty, appellant 
has admitted the existence of all of the elements of the 
crimE' of which she was convicted, thereby waiving the 
_,,_ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digi ization provided b  the Institute of Mus um and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
necessity for the taking of evidence, Farrow v. Smith, 
541 ?.2c"! 1107 (Utah 1975); CoP1bs v" Turner, supra; dnd 
waiving the right to be convicted by proof beyond all 
reasonable doubt. State v. Tourtellotte, 564 P.2d 799 
(Wash. 1977). In Combs, this Court said: 
"A plea of guilty dispenses with 
the necessity of proof, and the issue 
of innocence or guilt cannot here 
be relitigated any more than it 
could be after a jury verdict of guilty." 
483 P.2d at 439. 
Appellant, by now asking this Court to overturn 
the trial judge, thereby allowing a not guilty plea to be 
entered and her "defense" presented, is in effect aski~ 
this Court to hold that her unsubstantiated theory has 
merit, thus having the effect of relitigating the m~tter 
to which she pled guilty. This is contra to this Court's 
thinking as well as other state courts. The reason is 
obvious, as stated by the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. 
Rinehart, supra: 
.• it may be observed that if 
the mere fact that a defendant wh; has 
pleaded guilty and been sentenced may 
then be permitted to withdraw his plea 
because he has, or claims to have, a 
defense, he would then be permitted to 
gamble on the sentence; and if it did 
not please him, to demand a trial. 
125 N.W.2d at 245. 
A time lapse of more than four years has pass~ 
between the plea of guilty and sentencing, and the moti~ 
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to withdraw the guilty plea. To require the State to 
prosecute this case again and try it on its merits would 
be grossly prejudicial to the State, particularly in 
the area of locating witnesses and key documents. Some 
witnesses may have moved during the past four years, and 
documents may have been misplaced or lost. 
Assuming arguendo that appellant's alleged 
defenses could be examined by this Court, respondent 
submits that they are not persuasive. Appellant argues 
that the crime of obtaining merchandise by false pretenses 
was not committed because the auto dealer assigned the 
fraudulent finance agreement to the bank, and the victim, 
therefore, lost nothing. The logical extension of this 
argument is that a thief could steal any item without 
committing a crime as long as the owner was properly 
insured, because the owner would be compensated for his 
loss. This argument is clearly without merit. 
Appellant also claims that inasmuch as the car 
was recovered and resold, the bank suffered no out of 
pocket loss and the crime of false pretenses was not 
committed. Again, the extension of this argument is 
that a thief commits no crime unless the stolen goods are 
disposed of and the proceeds dissipated. This argument 
too is without merit. 
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Finally, appellant argues that the fact that 
some payments were made on the car, and that the car 
was insured, conclusively demonstrates a lack of fraudulen: 
intent. These factors are probative of the petitioner's 
intent, but they must be weighed against the fact that 
the appellant did fill out a fraudulent credit applic~~~ 
Unless the appellant intended to make payment in full at 
the time the falsified application was made, she cannot 
make out this defense. Even on the facts as alleged by 
appellant, it cannot be said that reasonable minds couM 
not differ as to the appellant's intent. 
Respondent submits that appellant's defense 
theories are without merit and should not be considered. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that appellant's 
petition should be dismissed for the following reasons: 
(1) the motion in arrest of judgment and for leave to 
withdraw a plea of guilty was untimely pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-24-3 (1953); (2) the trial court, in denyin: 
appellant's motion, did not abuse the discretion vested 
in it by Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-3 (1953); (3) appellant's 
plea was intelligent and voluntary, and not illicited 
through undue influence, coercion, or duress or ineffectiVi 
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counsel; (4) allegations by appellant are not 
supported by facts contained in the record; (5) 
appellant's alleged defenses to the crime of obtaining 
merchandise by false pretenses are not valid and should 
not be considered on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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